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How  do we go from personal to impersonal exchange? How  do we go from cooperation among kin to cooperation among 
strangers? 
Economic theory today explains the presence of cooperative behaviors and other-regarding behavior in terms of evolu- 
tionary biology and/or utilitarianism. Cooperation makes us evolutionarily fit, and it is in our  interest to cooperate, at least 
in  the long run. We  create complex human society through this evolutionary process and through the internalization of 
the rules that allow us to trade successfully with strangers. These explanations are  correct but fall short of explaining how 
we  generate, internalize, and institutionalize those rules of cooperation that allow us  to  go from personal to  impersonal 
exchange. Adam Smith’s ideas of moral imagination, sympathy, and innate desire to be both praised and praiseworthy may 
offer  a possible way to integrate and complete these explanations. 
The idea to use  Adam Smith and some of the literature of his  time to integrate the picture of human behavior emerging 
from experimental economics originates with Vernon Smith. In 1998 Vernon Smith introduced The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(TMS) – the “other” book of Adam Smith – into the experimental literature. Vernon Smith used TMS to help explain some 
experimental results with human and non-human primates and how those results relate to evolutionary biology. Given the 
depth of the insights and the stature of Adam Smith, Vernon Smith was followed by many more economists, and now TMS 
is relatively commonly seen in the experimental literature. This article is an attempt to develop the argument that Vernon 
Smith originally proposed. 
In particular, I suggest integrating Adam Smith’s ideas of sympathy, moral imagination, and praiseworthiness with the 
current explanations deriving from experimental results to possibly create a more complete picture of why and how humans 
cooperate, trust each other, and grow prosperous in industrialized societies. By this, by no  means do  I mean to  diminish 
the importance of the traditional explanations based on self-interest. Nor do I mean to juxtapose self-interest to something 
else.  Self-interest is and remains a major driving force of human cooperation. Other-regarding preferences and/or a moral 
sense do  not substitute for self-interest in any  respect, but they may integrate and fill the gaps in explanations of human 
cooperation among strangers that are  based exclusively on self-interest. Additionally, in considering this, by no means do I 
mean to indicate that what I suggest is the only explanation. I simply propose an argument as a possible explanation. Adam 
Smith’s analysis does not seem to contradict the existing explanations offered by evolutionary biology and neuroscience. His 
analysis seems relevant because it may integrate and potentially complete them. Another couple of caveats are  due. First, 
the description of Adam Smith’s views, provided herein, is instrumental to the explanation of problems we  face  in today’s 
literature. Smith’s primary concern was not about evolution or evolutionary biology as we  know it today. Nevertheless, as 
Vernon Smith has demonstrated, Adam Smith can be successfully used, even if out of context, to help us understand questions 
we face today. Vernon Smith chooses to look at Adam Smith as a possible source for answers, and I choose to follow his line of 
thought because in many ways Adam Smith asked similar questions to the ones we  ask today. Adam Smith’s broad Scottish 
Enlightenment background incorporates and merges knowledge and insights and it may offer  us different perspectives and 
answers that may be  otherwise hard for  us  to  see.  Secondly, I will  use  the word sympathy not as  a synonym of altruism 
or benevolence but in its  Smithian meaning: as a mechanism through which we  relate with others. The specific forms this 
mechanism takes will  be discussed below. 
  
 
If the analysis provided here is sound, the results are  relevant for  at least three reasons. First,  because it  shows the 
importance of moral imagination, praiseworthiness, and a sense of fairness in developing and sustaining complex commercial 
societies and the importance of commercial society for increasing not only prosperity but also cooperation. Second, because 
by understanding the process through which we  generate, internalize, and institutionalize rules of cooperation we  may be 
in  a better position to  understand how we  can  reach prosperity and cooperation. And  finally, it highlights opportunities 
to  integrate the homo  economicus of our  economic analysis, as Vernon Smith’s suggests, with some of the insights of the 
underappreciated depths of economic and social understanding in the 18th century, offering a potentially more complete 
picture of human behavior. 
The paper develops as follows. The first section describes some of the hypotheses used to explain cooperative behaviors 
in  the existing literature. It is followed by  the explanation of how Adam Smith may help us  understand the mechanism 
through which we  may be able to move from personal to impersonal exchange, namely the internalization of rules of coop- 
eration achieved through sympathy, reducing the transaction costs present in complex anonymous societies. The Smithian 
explanation is subdivided into three sections: the generation and internalization of cooperation at the individual level, at 
the social level, and the institutionalization of the rules of cooperation which may be seen as a feedback mechanism caused 
by  and causing increasing cooperation. The  final section of the paper briefly examines some limitations for  developing 
cooperation. 
 
1.  Vernon Smith and  economic experiments 
 
Vernon Smith fathered the branch of economics that uses human (and non-human) subjects in experiments to understand 
economic behavior. Despite accusations of “mechanicism” (Lee and Mirowski, 2007), Vernon Smith has increasingly and more 
vocally demonstrated interest in a broad and full view of human beings, looking at the 18th century as one of the possible 
sources of understanding and alternatives to the strict utilitarian mode (Smith, 2003, 2008, 2010). 
In experimental results in industrialized countries, cooperation and fairness are routinely observed. Cooperation and fair- 
ness may vary with the degree of anonymity, as subjects respond to incentives. Nevertheless, even with complete anonymity, 
a  relevant amount of cooperation and fairness is observed (see for  example Hoffman et al., 1996; Cox  and Deck,  2005; 
Cherry et al., 2002).1 Additionally, cooperation and fairness are  also  observable in many foraging societies across the globe, 
although in  different forms from the ones observed in  industrialized countries. Fairness seems to be  universally present 
among humans, even if it varies with different incentives and across cultures (Henrich et al., 2004). Interestingly, similar 
experiments done with non-human primates also show some level of cooperation and “fairness.” Non-human primates help 
each other in getting food  and reciprocate the help received. They  get  upset if one gets an  “unfair” share: if one primate 
undeservedly gets a larger portion or tastier food,  the other primate screams in protest (de  Waal, 1996, 2003; de Waal and 
Berger, 2000; de Waal and Luttrell, 1988; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Jansen et al., 2006). 
These experimental results show much more cooperation than economic theory predicts. So why do  we  cooperate so 
much? Smith (1998) presents a positive and negative reciprocity story using the behaviors of non-human primates to shed 
light on  the origins of some human behaviors. Cooperation evolves, in  part, when I punish you  if you  do  not cooperate 
and when I reciprocate if you  do cooperate. Increasing evidence, though not conclusive, suggests that non-human primates 
cooperate and have some sense of reciprocity and fairness, suggesting human behaviors evolved over millennia into what 
today seems like an innate sense of cooperation and fairness (de  Waal, 2009, cf. Berry,  2006; Clutton-Brock, 2009). 
These observations and explanations can  be complemented by evolutionary game theory models. Reciprocal behaviors, 
such as a tit-for-tat strategy, have been shown to be the most effective strategies over time (Axelrod, [1984] 2006). So it is 
reasonable to believe that reciprocity is a product of evolutionary fitness, or in Gordon Tullock’s words (Tullock, 1985), if in 
games the players decide with whom to  interact, and one player was found out to  be  disposed to  cheat, all others would 
avoid interacting with that player: “Where . . . there are  many alternatives, you  had better cooperate. If you  choose the 
noncooperative solution, you  may find you  have no one to noncooperate with” (p. 1081). 
So, thanks to  evolutionary fitness, it seems that we  now reciprocate and cooperate. Non-human primates show some 
cooperation, as social beings. Humans, as social beings, may have shared some basic forms of cooperation. However, humans 
cooperate much more than chimps and monkeys. Additionally, foraging societies show more cooperation the more their 
members are  faced with commercial realities (Henrich et al., 2010). And  industrialized societies, which are  imbedded in 
commerce, seem to show the highest level of cooperation. 
Genes and culture may combine to  help us  arrive at today’s (industrialized) high level of cooperation (Richerson and 
Boyd,  2005). One  aspect of culture that seems relevant, given the cross-cultural studies present so far,  is the exposure to 
markets. Controlling for other possible explanatory variables, Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) find that “market integration” (that 
is, do people engage frequently in market exchange?) accounts for a significant part of the variation between groups. The 
higher the level of market integration, the higher the level of cooperation and sharing in the experimental games. 
 
 
 
1   In a regular dictator game, where one player is given a positive amount of money and is asked to share it with another player, subjects share monetary 
rewards over 80 percent of the times. In a dictator game where it is known to all  parties that dictators have to earn the stakes to be shared (by answering 
correctly GMAT questions), subjects do not share as much (between 20 and 30 percent of the offers are nonzero offers). With the complete anonymity of a 
double blind procedure, a hard-core of 3–5 percent of the offers remains nonzero. 
  
 
 
So the questions: why do we  seem to have more cooperation in commercial societies than in non-commercial societies? 
How  can  commercial societies, large anonymous societies of strangers, cooperate and sustain themselves rather than dis- 
integrate? As societies expand, individuals may internalize the rules of cooperation to  which they are  accustomed. This 
becomes part of a positive reinforcement mechanism of reciprocity and reputation. Individuals in  small groups learn to 
cooperate through daily social engagements. They then are  more able to use  their cooperation-skills in other environments 
(Kimbrough and Wilson, forthcoming). Rules  of in-group cooperation are eventually somehow internalized so that coopera- 
tive  behaviors are  observed even in the absence of repeated or monitored interactions, but also  in the presence of strangers. 
Additionally, when exchange is non-coincident, it requires trust or at least monitoring the other’s behavior and being per- 
ceived to have the opportunity to punish defectors. The institutionalization of rules of fair  conduct and the punishment of 
deviant behaviors may have facilitated this expansion of cooperation (Greif,  2006; O’Hara,  2008). Industrialized countries’ 
tendency to  display more cooperation and prosperity than pre- and/or non-industrialized countries may be linked to  this 
shift. 
The  explanations offered are  powerful and appealing. Yet they leave some points unexplained. How  do  we  get  from 
screaming angrily at a group-member who does not divide the pie  fairly to giving money to the homeless in the streets of 
a foreign city? How do we  internalize and institutionalize rules of reciprocity so that they allow us to develop anonymous 
cooperation? A possible explanation as to how we  develop, internalize, and institutionalize rules of cooperation and their 
connection with market integration may come from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral  Sentiments: in addition to the economic 
explanations familiar to  us,  Smith also  employs imagination, sympathy, and the desire to  be  praiseworthy and not to  be 
blameworthy. These may allow Smith to offer  a possible way to complete the explanations offered today as to how we  are 
able to go from personal to impersonal exchange. 
 
2.  Adam  Smith and  cooperation 
 
Adam Smith seems at times to point toward a version of the utilitarian story presented today to explain why we are  such 
cooperative beings (TMS, II.ii.3.2). Nevertheless, TMS “make[s] clear that contemporary notions of reciprocity in economics 
and reciprocal altruism in biology, are  inadequate as oversimplified mechanical reductions in comparison with the concept 
as Smith applies it to human interaction” (Smith, 2010, p. 84. See also,  Young,  2001, p. 99;  Evensky, 2001, 2005). 
Right  after the utilitarian explanation of TMS II.ii.3.2, in TMS II.ii.3.4, Smith claims that human societies are  characterized 
by the presence of justice. Indeed, a human society without justice would not be possible. “Justice . . . is the main pillar that 
upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society . . . must in a moment crumble 
into atoms.” And how do we  introduce justice in human society? “In order to enforce the observation of justice, therefore, 
Nature has  implanted in  the human breast that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of merited punishment which 
attend upon its violation, as the greatest safe-guards of the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, 
and to chastise the guilty. Men,  though naturally sympathetic, feel  so little for another, with whom they have no particular 
connexion, in comparison to  what they feel  for  themselves . . . they have it so much in their power to  hurt him, and may 
have so many temptations to  do  so, that if this principle [“the consciousness of ill-desert” that “Nature has  implanted in 
the human breast”], did  not stand up  within them in his  defence, and overawe them into a respect for his  innocence, they 
would, like wild beasts, be at all times ready to fly upon him; and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den 
of lions” (p. 86). 
Here is a first component of the possible missing keys to understand how we are able to internalize the rules of cooperation 
that allow us to go from personal to impersonal cooperation that Adam Smith may offer  us. Not only do we  have our  innate 
self-interest, we also have an innate sense of ill-desert. As shown below, this sense of ill-desert is linked to our innate capacity 
to sympathize with others. Sympathy is our  innate ability to share the feelings of someone else,  our  innate ability to have 
fellow-feelings. To be able to understand Smith’s argument, we  first need to understand sympathy. 
The word sympathy is ambiguous. It contains at least three separate concepts. Sympathy can describe contagion, empathy, 
as well as sympathy proper (de  Waal, 2009, but cf. Khalil,  2011). Developments in neuroscience seem to  indicate that we 
process the information of the movements of another as if they were our  own movements, blurring the distinction between 
us and the other (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008; Iacoboni, 2008). The mirror neurons, responsible for these reactions called 
contagion, are present in both human and non-human animals and seem to be the most ancient form of sympathy (de Waal, 
2009). 
A more sophisticated form of contagion, which seems to have emerged at later stages of evolution, is empathy. Empathy 
allows me  to  feel  your sorrow and to  share your joy. Empathy allows me  to  process your emotions in my  brain as if your 
emotions were my emotions and also to react to them as if your emotions were my emotions, not just to process in my brain 
your physical movements as I would process mine. This instinctual channel with which we communicate with others, again, 
seems to be present in human as well as in non-human animals (de Waal, 2009). While the activities of the mirror neurons in 
the case of emotional contagion are observable only by “looking inside” someone’s brain, empathy can be observed also with 
the naked eye.  Empathy seems to be involved when an animal squeaks upon seeing another animal receiving an electrical 
shock, when you  gasp upon seeing that I am  about to fall, when you  smile upon seeing my smiling face. 
The  Smithian sympathy (and what in  the 18th century was called “emotional contagion”; see  Forget, 2003) seems to 
describe behaviors that today we  would associate with mirror neurons and call  empathy  (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008; 
Iacoboni, 2008). For Smith, indeed, sympathy is what causes us to “naturally shrink and draw back our  own leg or own arm” 
“when we  see  a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person”; it is what causes us to “feel  an 
itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent parts of the body” when we  have to  look  at “the sores and ulcers which 
are  exposed by beggars in the streets” (TMS I.i.1.3, p. 10). Additionally, “Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise 
  
 
merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused 
from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally 
concerned. Grief  and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look  and gestures of any  one, at once affect the spectator 
with some degree of a like  painful or agreeable emotion. A smiling face  is, to everybody that sees it, a cheerful object: as a 
sorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy one” (TMS I.i.1.6, p. 11). 
So far, we  have a mechanism that gives us a route toward cooperation. Copying and sharing the behaviors and passions 
of others seem to be an instinctual form of bonding among the social species. Human and non-human primates bond with 
their kin and in-group through emotional contagion and empathy. Had  Smith stopped here, he would not be able to offer  a 
possible explanation for the differences in complexity between the societies of human and non-human primates. The level 
of cooperation we share with other social species does not seem to provide a clear basis for the development of the complex 
rules of cooperation that we  observe in our  complex societies not only with our  group members, but also,  and especially, 
with strangers. 
But, Smith goes on, and adds imagination to empathy to explain what is properly called sympathy. In his view, this seems 
to  be  what allows us  to  form and internalize rules of fairness that in turn allow us  to  cooperate with strangers as well as 
with in-group members. 
Imagination, if understood as the ability to understand the future, is observable also  in non-human primates. Strategic 
imagination seems to explain many behaviors in  chimps (de  Waal, [1982] 2007). But  when something like  empathy is 
combined with imagination, through understanding (conscious or  not), a different kind of imagination seems to arise, a 
moral imagination, something that is more typical of humans. 
Sympathy proper, indeed, is for Smith innate in humans and is more than simply empathy. For Smith, indeed, sympathy 
is possible “by changing places in fancy with the sufferer” (TMS I.i.1.2–3, pp. 9–10). It is through our  imagination that we are 
able to transport ourselves into the shoes of other people and somehow understand and feel as they feel, even if imprecisely 
(see Griswold, 2006). But this implies * we understand the situation that generated the passions in the other. “[O]ur sympathy 
with the grief  or joy of another, before we  are  informed of the cause of either, is always extremely imperfect . . . Sympathy, 
therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it” (TMS I.i.i.9–10, 
pp. 11–12). It is our  ability to merge imagination, empathy, and reason, to merge emotions with understanding, even if not 
necessarily deliberate or conscious, that lets proper sympathy arise. It is “only [these] most advanced forms of knowing what 
others know [that] may be limited to our  own species” (de  Waal, 2009, p. 100). 
The importance of understanding “the situation which excites” one’s  passions may be related to why context seems to 
emerge as a powerful modifier of observed behaviors in experimental results. Indeed, as Smith (2010) notices: “There is no 
such thing in TMS as individual decisions making devoid of a social context. Social  context and all the experience derived 
from the need to take actions, and that deserves praise or blame, cannot be presumed to be left behind by the subjects when 
entering into these experimental games with monetary rewards. [. . .] In ultimatum, trust, and other such games, what incites 
resentment is the violation of the rules of fair play,  not the particular ‘unfair outcomes”’ (p. 85). 
So let us now go back to the monkey who gets an “unfair” share of food. A capuchin monkey that receives some cucumber 
rather than grapes, while its neighbor “unfairly” gets the grapes, will scream and yell and reject the cucumber. Humans also 
get  upset if someone does something unfair to us, just like monkeys do. This is not a calculated reaction. It is a gut  reaction, 
an emotional response, similar to the behaviors observed in non-human primates. Smith calls this reaction resentment, that 
innate sense of ill-desert that is the base of justice. de  Waal calls  this reaction in non-human primates “fairness,” which 
is also  linked to  cooperation among primates. But there is a major difference between human resentment a-la-Smith and 
non-human primate “fairness.” What is relevant for the argument presented here is not the screaming monkey, but what 
is not  observed in  the other monkey, the one with the grapes. The  monkey with the grapes will  keep eating his  grapes 
and not only ignore the angry other but reach out, grab, and eat  the rejected cucumber as well. There is no  active sharing 
(Brosnan and de  Waal, 2003. See also  Jansen et al., 2006; Brosnan and de  Waal, 2003; de  Waal and Brosnan, 2006; Mitani 
and Watts, 2005). But a human, according to Smith, would not necessarily behave like  de  Waal’s monkey with the grapes. 
Smith claims humans would not “keep eating their grapes” when faced with “unfairness:” humans would do two additional 
things, depending on the circumstances. 
A human would share the “grapes.” And, humans would even be willing to incur a cost to themselves to prevent or fix an 
injustice done to others in a situation in which they are  not directly involved, even if they would get  nothing out of it (Levy 
and Peart, 2004; for some recent experimental results on  third-party punishment see  Henrich et al., 2010). Why? Having 
both sympathy and a sense of ill-desert, when we observe an injustice done to others, we are able to feel and understand the 
resentment of the other. Because we  have this innate propensity to  imagine ourselves in the shoes of another, to  become 
indignant to a wrong done to us as well as to a wrong done to others, we are able to suffer with the sufferers, and to rejoice in 
someone’s joy, even if we get nothing out of it but the pleasure of mutual feelings. A human would be capable of correcting the 
blameworthy behavior, because humans have an innate desire to be praiseworthy and not to be blameworthy (TMS III.3.4–5, 
pp. 136–138). This is a possible way to understand how we  go from personal to impersonal exchange by internalizing rules 
of fair behavior, the details of which are  presented below. 
But before looking at the details of the mechanism though which the internalization of rules of fair conduct takes place, 
it is important to notice one more thing: that sympathy cannot be reduced to self-interest. Smith’s words are  worth citing 
in full. 
“But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in 
other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our  own breast; nor are  we  ever so much shocked as by the appearance 
of the contrary. Those who are  fond of deducing all our  sentiments from certain refinements of self-love, think themselves 
at no loss  to account, according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain. Man,  say they, conscious of his 
own weakness, and of the need which he has  for the assistance of others, rejoices whenever he observes that they adopt his 
  
 
own passions, because he  is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he  observes the contrary, because he  is 
then assured of their opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are  always felt so instantaneously, and often upon such 
frivolous occasions, that it seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such self-interested consideration. A man 
is mortified when, after having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round and sees that nobody laughs at his jests 
but himself. On the contrary, the mirth of the company is highly agreeable to  him, and he  regards this correspondence of 
their sentiments with his own as the greatest applause” (TMS I.i.2.1, pp. 13–14. Emphasis added). 
This  innate ability to  put ourselves in the shoes of others, sympathy proper, offers a route toward explaining how  we 
internalized and how  we  institutionalize cooperative behaviors, and explanation involves two levels. Smith explains how 
the internalization of cooperative behavior takes place at the individual level as well as at the social level. His explanations 
rely  on moral imagination, sympathy, and the desire to be praiseworthy and not to be blameworthy, that is to our  ability to 
understand deserved gratitude and resentment. 
 
3.  Generation and  internalization of cooperative behaviors at the individual level 
 
When someone does wrong to me,  I resent the wrongdoer. Similarly, when I see  someone doing wrong to someone else, 
and I see  how this person gets upset at and resents the wrongdoer, I imagine myself in his place and share the resentment. 
The wrongdoer deserves the resentment of the wronged person and of the people who observe the wrong. By observing the 
reaction of the other, I then realize that if I did  the same wrong, others would resent me  as well; and deservedly so. Since  I 
do not want to be the object of such resentment and blame, I will, therefore, try to avoid that behavior. Similarly, if someone 
is kind to me,  I experience gratitude. And if I see  an  act  of kindness and the gratitude experienced by the receiver toward 
the giver, who indeed deserves that gratitude, with my imagination, I share the gratitude and praise the giver. By observing 
the other, I then realize that I also  want to be the object of such praise. I will  therefore imitate that behavior. So, thanks to 
the experience of others, to our  innate desire to be praiseworthy and not to be blameworthy, and to our  moral imagination, 
which is sympathy proper, “we suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior, and endeavour to imagine what effect 
it would, in this light, produce upon us. This  is the only looking-glass by which we  can,  in some measure, with the  eyes of 
other people,  scrutinize the propriety of our  own conduct” (TMS III.i.5, p. 112.  Emphasis added). 
At the individual level, thanks to our  experience of observing others, with our  moral imagination, we  are  able to divide 
ourselves in two: an I-agent and an I-spectator. The I-spectator gives deserved praise to the I-agent, just as we give deserved 
praise to someone when we  see  a praiseworthy behavior. The I-spectator also  gives deserved blame to the I-agent, just as 
we give deserved blame to someone when we see a blameworthy behavior. Because we want to be the object of praise (and 
not simply to  be  praised) and to  avoid being the object of blame from others (and not simply to  avoid being blamed), we 
behave in a way that another would judge praiseworthy and not blameworthy. We  do so by imagining how the other may 
see us, by placing ourselves in the shoes of the other and feeling what he would feel. The presence of others is indispensable 
to allow us to develop this ability to imagine ourselves as someone else  would see  us. With enough practice, we  will be able 
to see  ourselves with the eyes of an impartial spectator, of an impartial other, even if the other is not physically there. We 
will  behave in a praiseworthy way, even if no one is watching us. At that point, I will  not cheat you,  not because I fear  your 
retaliation or because you will think I am blameworthy, but because I myself will be able to see my behavior as blameworthy. 
So you  no longer need to be there for me  to be honest. I will  be honest anyway, because I now know that one who is honest 
is the object of praise and one who is dishonest is the object of blame. 
What I think is appealing about Smith’s explanation is that we  develop our  impartial spectator through the presence of 
others, of strangers in particular. We start our  moral development process with our  kin and in-group, but the heavy-lifting 
for the development of impartiality is done thanks to the presence of strangers. We  desire to be the object of praise in the 
eyes of a kin  member as well as in the eyes of a stranger. And,  if we  develop an  impartial spectator within us,  thanks to 
our  interactions with others and with strangers in particular, then we  are  able to  reduce the external cost of monitoring 
non-cooperative behavior with in-group members and especially with strangers, which would be so tempting in particular 
with one-time interactions. 
The full development of the impartial spectator is something that very few individuals are able to achieve over the course 
of their lifetimes. Nevertheless, the presence of this ever-watchful internal eye  may be significant enough to promote and 
maintain a certain level of cooperation among strangers. Thus,  Smith may offer  us  an  explanation for human cooperation 
that works with kin  as well as with non-kin. This kind of behavior seems indeed somehow to be captured in double blind 
experiments. In spite of the double blind treatments, we  always observe a hard residue of sympathetic cooperation. 
 
 
 
4.  Generation and  internalization of rules of cooperation at the social level 
 
How we generate and internalize social rules of cooperative behaviors is explained through the same mechanism. Through 
our  common propensity to share others’ feelings and “the love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose 
character and conduct we  approve of” (TMS III.2.2, p. 114), we  learn from each other what generates praise or blame, what 
is praiseworthy or blameworthy. We  want to imitate or avoid that behavior, and so we  embody that learning into rules of 
just conduct that will  guide our  present and future behavior, those rules so much needed to  cooperate with strangers, as 
well as with our  in-group. 
Let us say that someone does something wrong. “We hear every body about us express the like detestations against [these 
wrong actions]. This still  further confirms, and even exasperates our  natural sense of deformity. It satisfies us that we  view 
them in the proper light, when we  see  other people view them in the same light. We  resolve never to be guilty of the like, 
nor ever, upon any  account, to  render ourselves in this manner the objects of universal disapprobation. We thus  naturally 
  
 
lay down to ourselves a general rule,  that all such actions are  to  be  avoided, as tending to  render us  odious, contemptible, 
or  punishable, the objects of all  those sentiments for  which we  have the greatest dread and aversion. Other actions, on 
the contrary, call forth our  approbation, and we  hear every body around us express the same favorable opinion concerning 
them. Every  body is eager to  honour and reward them. They  excite all those sentiments for which we  have by nature the 
strongest desire; the love,  the gratitude, the admiration of mankind. We become ambitious of performing the like; and  thus 
naturally lay down to ourselves a rule of another kind, that every opportunity of acting in this manner is carefully to be sought 
after” (TMS III.4.7, p. 159.  Emphasis added). Thanks to  our  innate sympathy and desire to  be  praiseworthy and not to  be 
blameworthy, by collecting the experience of many and transmitting that knowledge to many others, we  form social rules 
of moral conduct, internalizing cooperative behaviors. 
So we  may have a possible explanation for how  we  generate and internalize rules of cooperation. Rules  of cooperation 
are  formed and internalized, according to  Smith, thanks to  our  imagination, our  sympathy, our  desire to  be  praiseworthy 
and to receive the approbation of others, and our  desire not to deserve the blame of others. 
Note, as Smith (2010, p. 84)  does, the difference between Smith and modern explanations that may incorporate esteem 
or praise. The internalization process that is commonly described today goes from praise to praiseworthiness. I want to be 
praised and eventually I will  become praiseworthy. Smith explicitly rejects this argument to propose its  opposite instead. 
Smith claims that what is natural is our  desire to be praiseworthy and not to be blameworthy and what is derived from it 
is our  desire to be praised and not to be blamed. “The love  of praise-worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the 
love  of praise. Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are  connected, and often blended with 
one another, are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent of one another. The love and admiration which we naturally 
conceive for  those whose character and conduct we  approve of, necessarily dispose us  to  desire to  become ourselves the 
objects of the like  agreeable sentiments, and to  be  as  amiable and as  admirable as  those whom we  love  and admire the 
most . . . Neither can we be satisfied with being merely admired for what other people are admired. We must at least believe 
ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. But, in order to attain this satisfaction, we must become the impartial 
spectators of our  own character and conduct . . . Their approbation necessarily confirms our  own self-approbation. Their 
praise necessarily strengthens our own sense of our own praise-worthiness. In this case, so far is the love of praise-worthiness 
from being derived altogether from that of praise; that the love  of praise seems, at least in a great measure, to be derived 
from that of praise-worthiness” (TMS III.2.2, p. 114). 
So Smith may provide us  with a possible mechanism through which we  generate and internalize rules of cooperation. 
He  also  may provide us  a feedback mechanism through which our  natural cooperation is enhanced: commerce and the 
institutionalization of the rules of cooperation that seem to come with it. 
 
5.  The institutionalization of rules of cooperation and  their role as feedback mechanisms 
 
Human interactions  seem  to   shape  the  environment in   which  one  lives   and  the  environment in   which  one 
lives   may  provide  a   feedback  mechanism  that  shapes  humans’  behaviors.  Different environments,  indeed,  may 
affect  us   differently.  In   particular,  commerce  and  commercial  societies  seem  to   effectively institutionalize  rules 
of   cooperation  and  to   provide  an   environment  which  favors  cooperation  farther.  “Such   internalization  [of   fair- 
ness norms in  more market-oriented  societies] would require that  fairness is  learned in  the course of  the market 
exchange,  and  we   have  evidence that  this  is   the  case  across the  development  of   the  life   cycle.   Camerer and 
Thaler (1995) agree that  norms  of  fairness are   learned, noting that  kindergarteners are   most  selfish in  economic 
experiments,  while  by   the  sixth  grade,  more  fair   behavior  toward  one’s    peers  emerges”  (Ensminger,  2004,  p. 
358). 
Also  Adam Smith tells us  that fairness, rules of cooperation and sharing may feed and feed off different institutional 
environments. Cooperation and development of moral sense evolve with both our  internal judgment and with external 
institutions. Humans, being social animals, have always cooperated with each other, in one way or another. All social animals 
generally survive through in-group cooperation. But humans, differently from other non-human social animals, cooperate 
also  with non-group members, they cooperate with strangers. Commerce is an  institutional setting in which cooperation 
with strangers is the norm, rather than the exception. Notice that commerce is not merely to exchange. Our “propensity to 
truck, barter and exchange” is innate for Smith. Commerce is not. Commerce is what characterizes commercial societies, just 
like  feud is what characterizes feudal societies, agriculture agrarian societies, and pasture pastoral societies. In all societies 
there is exchange, but in commercial societies, impersonal market transactions dominate the social and economic structure. 
Smith tells us that the opportunity to trade with strangers allows individuals to learn more easily how to interact with 
others in a fairer way, without being exclusively motivated by fear  of retaliation. The opportunity to  trade with strangers 
also  allows for the generation of institutions that facilitate cooperation, which in their turn facilitate the internalization of 
cooperation. Commerce, the social and economic structure in which impersonal exchange with strangers is the norm, seems 
therefore to reduce the cost of cooperation and to increase how relevant cooperation is in our  life (Henrich et al., 2010). 
Not only the wealth generated by commerce let us abandon the practice of abandoning unwanted children to be devoured 
by  wild beasts (WN,  introduction), and allows honesty to  increase with the decrease of dependency and the increase of 
interdependency (LJ(B), 205; WN  III.iv.4. See  Young,  2001). But,  commerce also  brings “order and good government, and 
with them, the liberty and security of individuals . . . This, though it has  been the least observed, is by far the most important 
of all their effects” (WN  III.iv.4, p. 412). Commerce therefore generates the “regular administration of justice,” which is a 
way in  which rules of cooperation are  institutionalized, and the foundation of commercial prosperity (Rosenberg, 1990; 
Rasmussen, 2006; Smith, 2010). 
Adam Smith also tells us someone else  before him noticed that commerce increases cooperation, these effects that today 
we,  at times, call “market integration:” David Hume. Hume ([1752] 1987), in particular in his  essays “Of Refinement in the 
  
 
Arts,” claims that commerce brings about an increase in sociability and humanity. Commercial societies are  generally richer 
than non-commercial societies. More people have more wealth. And the more wealth we have, the more we cluster together 
to show off our  wealth to others. The increased interaction with strangers, the increased opportunities for men to interact 
with women, makes people more sociable and more humane, and more cooperative. Commerce “softens” the human spirit. 
“So that, beside the improvements which they [mankind] receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impossible but 
they must feel an encrease of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other’s pleasure 
and entertainment. Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from 
experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious 
ages” (Hume, [1752] 1987, p. 271.  Emphasis in original). 
Adam Smith and his  18th century contemporaries would not be  surprised by today’s cross-cultural results suggesting 
that differences in cooperation and fairness occur in part due to the degree of market integration (Henrich et al., 2004, 2010), 
and in those writers we  may find an  explanation. The increase in prosperity brought about by the internalization and the 
institutionalization of the rules of cooperation and at the same time made possible because of these rules of cooperation 
allows us to further develop cooperation. The increasing presence of commerce seems to become both the internalized and 
the institutionalized social glue needed to keep together large assemblies of strangers (Paganelli, 2008). 
 
 
6.  Additional parallels 
 
Adam Smith as well as David Hume, Adam Ferguson ([1767] 2007), and other 18th century writers count the internal- 
ization and the institutionalization of the rules of cooperation as  some of the benefits that come with commerce (Clark, 
2007). Yet, they also  see  the potential fragility of these benefits. Similarly, in today’s experimental results we  can  observe 
how cooperation among strangers may not emerge or may easily disappear. 
Increases in wealth sometimes bring about large opportunities for gain.  Our 18th century writers recognize at least two 
potential problems with this: larger opportunities for opportunistic behaviors, which would eventually undermine the moral 
base of commerce and the individual trust that commerce tends to develop, and rent-seeking, which would undermine the 
institutional trust that commerce tends to encourage. 
Rent-seeking indeed implies both that the few benefit at the expense of many because of the former’s ability to gain some 
government’s favors, and that the rent-seeker will  likely rely  more and more on  government and its  power and authority 
to allocate resources and resolve disputes, substituting the rules of cooperation generated by commerce (Paganelli, 2009). 
Adam Smith explains that bad policies (and bad luck) may prevent or  disrupt the natural tendency toward cooperation: 
“The difference between the genius of the British constitution which protects and governs North America, and that of the 
mercantile company which oppresses and domineers in the East  Indias, cannot perhaps be  better illustrated than by the 
different state of those countries” (WN, I.viii.26, p. 91).  The American colonies are  a growing economy, Bengal is poor and 
declining instead. The “natural progress of things” is not a necessary outcome. 
Additionally, experimental results seem to  indicate that once trust is broken, it is difficult to  recreate it (for  example, 
Rigdon et al., 2007). They also seem to indicate that the rules of fairness internalized in anonymous societies may be crowded 
out by  the ever-present monitoring eye  of the government. Ostrom (2005) presents evidence of this crowding out from 
results of Public Goods games: “Voluntary behavior is the result of what we  have called the predisposition to  contribute 
to  a cooperative endeavor, contingent upon the cooperation of others. The monetary incentive to  contribute destroys the 
cooperative nature of the task, and the threat of fining defectors may be  perceived as  being an  unkind or  hostile action 
(especially if the fine is imposed by agents who have an antagonistic relationship with group members). The crowding out of 
voluntary cooperation and altruistic punishment occurs because the preconditions for the operation of strong reciprocity are 
removed when explicit material incentives are  applied to the task” (p. 20). Material incentives crowd out moral incentives, 
since moral incentives are  treated as irrelevant (Handy, 2008). 
It would be  instructive to  have more experimental evidence on  how we  may have gone from personal to  impersonal 
exchange, based on the insights of Adam Smith and his contemporaries, on the role of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, 
as opposed to simply trust, trustworthiness, reputation, or fear of punishment; as well as on how fragile or robust impersonal 
exchange is, how susceptible to the destruction of trust caused by unconstrained self-interest or by the over-monitoring of 
an external power. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Social  animals evolved to  cooperate among each other. It  is  therefore not surprising, in  a  sense, to  observe coop- 
eration among members of  the same group. But  while, for  example, members of  a  community of  chimps cooperate 
with  each other,  if  a  stranger  walks in   their  community, most  likely it   will   be   ripped  apart.  Humans in   many 
ways behave in  a  similar  way. We   experience in-group cooperation and we   do  not offer   non-group members the 
same kind of  cooperative behavior. Yet,  we   are   capable of  cooperating with strangers; we   are   capable of  personal 
exchange as  well as  of  impersonal exchange. Our  observations are  corroborated by  experimental results suggesting a 
high level of  cooperation among humans, even under complete anonymity conditions. It  seems this ability to  cooper- 
ate  with strangers, among other ways, through impersonal exchange, allows us  to develop complex and prosperous 
societies. 
Understanding how humans go  from personal to  impersonal exchange is  an  open research question, which attracts 
potential answers from different directions. For example, evolutionary game theory offers a positive and negative reciprocity 
explanation, where, thanks to  repeated games, we  learn that cooperation is in  our  best interest in  the long run, so  we 
  
 
eventually internalize these rules of cooperation. Neuroscience proposes a possible explanation based on  mirror neurons, 
thanks to  which we  seem to  blur the distinction between ourselves and others. Primatology suggests the presence of an 
evolved sense of “fairness” and in-group cooperation among members of social species. These explanations are  powerful 
and possibly correct. Yet they fall short to address how  humans are  able to generate, internalize, and institutionalize rules 
of cooperation not just with in-group members, but also  with strangers. 
Vernon Smith recognizes that, in the 18th century, Adam Smith asked similar questions and proposed answers that in 
a way are  similar to ours, in a way are  simpler and in a way are  more sophisticated and complex than ours. Adam Smith’s 
answer does not seem to contradict the existing answers we  have today, but may integrate them by introducing the idea of 
moral imagination, sympathy, and the innate desire to be praiseworthy and not to be blameworthy, concepts that so far are 
not explicitly incorporated in the experimental literature. 
The problem of cooperation may be analyzed on  two levels: cooperation within group members and cooperation with 
non-group members. In-group cooperation may be a natural characteristic of social species. Cooperation with strangers on 
the other hand seems to be typical only of the human species and is what calls for a more thorough explanation. Adam Smith 
seems to be  aware of this distinction. His worry with in-group cooperation is not so much to  explain its  presence, but to 
limit it. The natural tendency to “too  much” cooperation within a group may cause factional wars and disrupt social peace 
and growth (Levy and Peart, 2009). Smith sees in our  innate sympathy and innate desire to be praiseworthy and not to be 
blameworthy a way through which we  are  able to limit the potential disruptions of excess in-group cooperation (Farrant, 
2010) and a way through which we  are  able to extend cooperation to strangers. 
Moral imagination, sympathy, and the desire to  be  praiseworthy and not to  be  blameworthy may help improving our 
understanding of the generation, the sustainment, and development of cooperation among strangers and how human coop- 
eration develops from personal to  impersonal exchange. A better understanding of the processes of our  cooperation with 
strangers may enhance not just our  knowledge, but also  our  ability to peacefully increase our  prosperity. 
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